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CONTRACT LAW
I. LIMITATION OF REMEDIES AND DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES
RESTRICTED
It is not uncommon for a seller of goods to attempt to limit
its liability to a buyer by printing on the goods themselves a
limitation of remedies and disclaimer of warranties, the terms of
which were not brought to the buyer's attention prior to the ac-
tual delivery of the goods. In Gold Kist, Inc. v. Citizens and
Southern National Bank of South Carolina1 the South Carolina
Court of Appeals2 substantially limited the ability of a seller to
protect itself in this manner. The Gold Kist decision is signifi-
cant for two reasons: Not only did it involve a case of first im-
pression in South Carolina, but the court also declined to follow
a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision on the same issue of
law, although involving somewhat different facts.3
On the advice of a salesperson at Gold Kist, J.C. Lanham
and his sons purchased a quantity of Coker-77 corn seed on an
open account.4 Gold Kist represented to the Lanhams that the
seed would produce a very high yield of corn. When the seed
instead produced a yield far less than that anticipated, the
Lanhams refused to pay the account.5 Gold Kist then initiated
an action to recover the amount owed. The Lanhams defended
on the ground that the seed was defective. In addition, the
Lanhams counterclaimed for actual and punitive damages, alleg-
ing breach of actual and implied warranties and fraud.6 Gold
1. 286 S.C. 272, 333 S.E.2d 67 (Ct. App. 1985).
2. To avoid confusion while comparing the South Carolina Court of Appeals with
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the South Carolina Court of Appeals will be re-
ferred to herein as simply "the court."
3. See Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 696 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1982).
4. Gold Kist was doing business as the Farmers Mutual Exchange, the store from
which the Lanhams purchased the defective seed. J.C. Lanham, the original defendant in
the action, died during the proceedings and was replaced by Citizens and Southern Na-
tional Bank of South Carolina, the executor of his estate. See 286 S.C. at 274, 333 S.E.2d
at 69.
5. For the factual background of the case, see 286 S.C. at 274-75, 333 S.E.2d at 69-
70.
6. The court accepted Gold Kist's argument that the Lanhams had failed to estab-
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Kist responded by pointing to the disclaimer printed on the bags
of corn seed delivered to the Lanhams. Under the terms of the
disclaimer, the buyer of defective seed was limited to a recovery
of the purchase price.
Relying on the lower court's findings of fact and citing cases
from six other jurisdictions," the court concluded that the par-
ties had completed the bargaining process and reached an agree-
ment prior to the delivery of the seed bags.e The disclaimer was
not brought to the Lanhams' attention before the delivery of the
seed. Thus, the court found that the disclaimer was not part of
the bargain between the parties.10 The court's decision brings
South Carolina into conformity with the prevailing interpreta-
tion of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). 11 In so doing, the
lish the nine standard elements of fraud and thus held that the trial judge should have
granted Gold Kist's motion for a directed verdict on this issue. This was not, however,
reversible error because "where a jury returns a general verdict in a case involving two or
more iesues or defenses and its verdict is supported as to at least one issue or defense,
the verdict will not be reversed." 286 S.C. at 282, 333 S.E.2d at 73.
7. The text of the disclaimer was as follows:
NOTICE TO BUYER - LIMITATION OF WARRANTY
Seller warrants that the seed sold by it conforms to the descriptions on the
label .... This warranty excludes and is in lieu of all other warranties, ex-
pressed or implied, including any warranty of merchantability and of fitness
for a particular purpose which are hereby expressly disclaimed. . . . [I]t is ex-
pressly agreed that the Seller's liability to the Buyer. . . shall be limited solely
to the amount of the purchase price of the seed. The remedy provided herein
shall be the exclusive and sole remedy of the Buyer for any such loss. In no
event shall the Seller be liable for any consequential or incidental damages
Acceptance of the seeds. . . constitutes acknowledgement that the limita-
tions and disclaimers herein set forth are conditions of the sale and constitute
the entire agreement between the parties regarding warranty or other liabilities
and the remedy therefor.
286 S.C. at 276 n.2, 333 S.E.2d at 70 n.2.
8. See Klein v. Asgrow Seed Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 87, 54 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1966);
Pennington Grain & Seed, Inc. v. Tuten, 422 So. 2d 948 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Chris-
topher & Son, Inc. v. Kansas Paint & Color Co., 215 Kan. 185, 523 P.2d 709 (1974);
Pfizer Genetics, Inc. v. Williams Management Co., 204 Neb. 151, 281 N.W.2d 536 (1979);
Willoughby v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 601 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Hartwig Farms,
Inc. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 28 Wash. App. 539, 625 P,2d 171 (1981).
9. 286 S.C. at 277, 333 S.E.2d at 71.
10. Id.
11. Id., 333 S.E.2d at 70. This is not to imply that the decision constitutes a radical
departure from established state law. It is in harmony with earlier South Carolina deci-
sions on related questions. See, e.g., Durant v. Palmetto Chevrolet Co., 241 S.C. 508, 129
S.E.2d 323 (1963)(written warranty given to purchaser of car from retail dealership after
time of delivery held not to modify oral warranty given to consumer at time of sale).
2
South arolina Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol38/iss1/6
CONTRACT LAW
court in Gold Kist rejected the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of
the same law in Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp.12 The court in
Hill specifically found that the disclaimer was not a post-con-
tractual attempt to limit liability. 13 The opinion revealed that
the buyer read the disclaimer before using the herbicide and, al-
though invited to return the product if the terms were unaccept-
able, retained and used it. 14 Unlike Hill, however, the disclaimer
in Gold Kist did not expressly invite the buyer to repudiate the
contract if the terms of the disclaimer were unacceptable. The
court also found that the Lanhams were unaware of the dis-
claimer.' 5 Although either of these factual differences would
have been sufficient in itself to distinguish Hill from Gold Kist,
the court instead chose to reject Hill.
The court stated that it rejected the Hill decision because it
could not determine why the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
found the disclaimer to be part of the bargain between the par-
ties.-6 The court, however, failed to explain why the disclaimer,
under the circumstances of Hill, was not a part of that particu-
lar bargain. Thus, the court's position is uncertain. The court
may have believed that the Fourth Circuit failed to make a
proper analysis of a potentially valid disclaimer; alternatively,
the court may have believed that the Hill disclaimer could not
have been valid under any possible analysis. I"
If one attempts to determine what has replaced Hill as
South Carolina law, one encounters a similar ambiguity. The
court's string citation of cases from six states failed to note the
differences among the cases. For example, the Supreme Court of
Nebraska, in Pfizer Genetics, Inc. v. Williams Management
Co.,"8 states that "disclaimers ... made on or after delivery of
the goods . . . are ineffectual unless the buyer assents or is
charged with knowledge as to the transaction.' ' In contrast, the
12. 696 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1982).
13. Id. at 290-91.
14. Id. at 291.
15. 286 S.C. at 277, 333 S.E.2d at 71.
16. Id. at 278, 333 S.E.2d at 71.
17. For example, the court mentions the possibility of modification of the contract
under U.C.C. § 2-209, but does not explain whether the Hill outcome could have been
justified by an analysis along these lines. 286 S.C. at 277-78, 333 S.E.2d at 71.
18. 204 Neb. 151, 281 N.W.2d 536 (1979).
19. Id. at 155, 281 N.W.2d at 539.
1986]
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Washington Court of Appeals, in Hartwig Farms v. Pacific
Gamble Robinson Co., 20 required an explicit assent following
overt negotiation concerning the disclaimer. Under Hartwig, the
buyer's mere knowledge of the disclaimer is insufficient to estab-
lish assent. The Gold Kist court's use of authorities leaves un-
certain which position, if any, is endorsed among those it cites.2
1
The court was certainly correct in declining to follow Hill.
The Gold Kist decision can be criticized only in that its repudia-
tion of Hill does not go as far as it could, or should, have gone.
The reasoning employed by the Fourth Circuit in Hill is essen-
tially that of the justly discredited Roto-Lith doctrine.22 In
Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co. 2 3 the First Circuit, inter-
preting UCC section 2-207,24 held that a disclaimer in a sales
acknowledgement constituted a material alteration in the terms
of a contract and that a buyer who accepted goods described in
the sales acknowledgement became bound by the disclaimer. 25
Commentators have criticized this decision: "This approach
gives one party (who fortuitously sent the second document) all
of his terms. In our view, Code draftsmen have chosen not to
take this approach. ' 26 This, however, is precisely the approach
taken by the Fourth Circuit.
Under Hill, a seller always has the last word and may be
20. 28 Wash. App. 539, 625 P.2d 171 (1981).
21. For instance, in its rejection of Hill, the court may be suggesting that the
buyer's knowledge of the disclaimer, acquired at the time of delivery, was insufficient to
make the disclaimer effective. Hill had knowledge of the disclaimer and an invitation to
object. This interpretation leaves two unanswered questions: Could the disclaimer be
effective if knowledge was acquired before or during the negotiations between the par-
ties, and does it matter whether the knowledge is actual or constructive? On the other
hand, the use of the disjunctive in the following statement suggests that the buyer's
knowledge of the disclaimer may be sufficient: "[T]here is no evidence that the Lanhams
ever learned of or accepted the terms of the disclaimer prior to the litigation in issue."
286 S.C. at 278, 333 S.E.2d at 71. The court's language here does not necessarily restrict
a buyer's knowledge of or assent to a disclaimer at the time prior to the completion of
the agreement to create the possibility that the buyer is bound by the disclaimer.
22. For a criticism of Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir.
1962), see Hartwig Farms, 28 Wash. App. at -, 625 P.2d at 174.
23. 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962).
24. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. Ch. 106, § 2-207 (West 1958).
25. 297 F.2d at 500.
26. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE 34 (2d ed. 1980)(footnote omitted) [hereinafter WHITE & SUMMERS]. The au-
thors, citing Roto-Lith, state that, "Certainly there are Code decisions that other courts
should not follow." Id. at 10.
[Vol. 38
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able to use it to force new terms, which are favorable to the
seller, on a buyer who may have altered his position in expecta-
tion of receiving the specified goods at the price and on the date
agreed to by the parties.2 7 Exploitation of a buyer's position at
the time of delivery is both unjust and inconsistent with the
UCC. In addition, under these circumstances it is difficult to see
how a buyer can have a genuine "opportunity to object," as re-
quired by UCC section 2-209,28 the provisions on contract modi-
fication. No policy forbids requiring a seller to communicate dis-
claimers at the time the sale is negotiated. Thus, the insistence
of the Hartwig court on actual assent, after explicit bargaining,
to any attempted disclaimer of the seller is both fair and
reasonable.
The practitioner who attempts to evaluate the likely impact
of Gold Kist on his or her client's business practices should also
take note of two relevant issues not raised in the case. In Hill v.
BASF Wyandotte Corp.29 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that a disclaimer of liability for any consequential, special,
or indirect damages still left a negligent supplier of agricultural
products liable for "the value the crop would have had if the
product had conformed to the warranty less the value of the
crop actually produced less the expenses [avoided by the prod-
27. Suppose that two parties negotiate a sale of goods on January 1 and set March 1
as the delivery date. If, in the interim, the price increases or the supply declines, the
seller can add a disclaimer in the subsequent paperwork or print one on the goods them-
selves, effectively offering the buyer only two choices: Either agree to surrender valuable
legal remedies or find an alternative source, if one exists, of the goods. Even if substitute
goods can be obtained at the contract price, the buyer has undergone substantial incon-
venience and has accepted goods which were not his first choice. Of course, if the seller
knew in advance that the goods themselves would contain the disclaimer and made no
effort to bring it to the buyer's attention until the actual delivery, then the words of the
Gold Kist trial judge seem applicable:
[T]he seed was delivered at a time when the fields had been fully prepared to
receive the seed at a considerable expense by the Defendant [the Lanhams]
and when the planting season was drawing to a close. . . [The disclaimer] as
printed on the seed bag by the Plaintiff constituted a sharp practice and a
questionable business dealing.
Record at 39, 41.
28. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-209 (1976).
29. 280 S.C. 174, 311 S.E.2d 734 (1984). The Fourth Circuit remanded Hill to the
district court, which then certified to the South Carolina Supreme Court, pursuant to
S.C. Sup. CT. R. 46, this question: "[W]hat is the measure of actual damages in a herbi-
cide failure case where there is a valid limitation of consequential, special, or indirect
damages?" 280 S.C. at 175, 311 S.E.2d at 735; see Hill, 696 F.2d at 287.
1986]
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uct failure]. '30 In response to the seller's objection that this
formula includes a recovery for lost profits, the supreme court
rather coyly stated that any inclusion of lost profits in the mea-
sure of damages was "coincidental." 31 Thus, a seller who wishes
to avoid this result should take care that its disclaimer is not
only effective under Gold Kist, but that it also does more than
merely exclude consequential damages, perhaps through a limi-
tation of recovery to the purchase price, as in Hill.
An even greater obstacle to a seller's attempt to disclaim
warranties at the time of delivery may arise through the opera-
tion of the Statute of Frauds.32 According to UCC section 2-
209(3), 33 a contract modification must conform to the statute of
frauds.3 As a practical matter, if a disclaimer printed on the
goods is regarded as a section 2-209 modification, it would be
wholly ineffective because a buyer probably would not have an
opportunity to sign it, even if he wished to do so.
The precise contours of South Carolina's law on disclaimers
made at the time of delivery are uncertain. The Gold Kist deci-
sion, however, limits a seller's use of disclaimers since a seller
can no longer rely on a notice printed on the goods themselves
and not brought to the buyer's attention until actual delivery to
protect itself against unwanted liability.
Peter R. Roest
II. SUBSTANTIAL IMPAIRMENT OF VALUE Is A QUESTION OF FACT
A. Substantial Impairment in a Single Performance
Contract
In Burris v. Lake Wylie Marina, Inc.3 5 the South Carolina
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of a buyer attempting to revoke
30. 280 S.C. at 177, 311 S.E.2d at 736.
31. Id. at 178, 311 S.E.2d at 736.
32. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-206 (1976).
33. Id. § 36-2-209(3) (1976).
34. See WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 26, at 446. The authors would hold ineffec-
tive any disclaimer such as is involved in Hill and Gold Kist unless the requirements of
U.C.C. § 2-209 were met. Id.
35. 285 S.C. 614, 330 S.E.2d 559 (Ct. App. 1985). The plaintiff's name is misspelled
in the reporter. See Record at 263.
[Vol. 38
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his acceptance of a boat pursuant to section 36-2-608 of the
South Carolina Code." In reaching this result, the court stated
that "[w]hether the nonconformity of a product substantially
impairs its value to a buyer is a question of fact and not one of
law."' 37 This decision places South Carolina among the majority
of states that hold substantial impairment to be an issue of
fact.88 The court of appeals, however, left unanswered many im-
portant and analytically difficult issues relating to the concept of
substantial impairment.
Burris, the buyer, entered into a contract to purchase a boat
from the seller, Lake Wylie Marina. The sales agent for the ma-
rina assured Burris that the boat was a "demonstrator," mean-
ing that the boat had no previous owner.8 9 Burris subsequently
discovered that the boat had been used, and promptly sought to
return it to the marina. When the marina refused to accept the
boat, Burris brought this action to revoke his acceptance of the
boat pursuant to section 36-2-608.40 The jury returned a verdict
36. South Carolina Code § 36-2-608 provides:
(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose
nonconformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its nonconformity would be cured
and it has not been seasonably cured; or
(b) without discovery of such nonconformity if his acceptance was reasona-
bly induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the
seller's assurances.
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the
buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any
substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own
defects. It is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it.
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to the
goods involved as if he had rejected them.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-608 (1976).
37. 285 S.C. at 615, 330 S.E.2d at 560.
38. See Mobile Home Sales Management Inc. v. Brown, 115 Ariz. App. 11, 16, 562
P.2d 1378, 1383 (1977); Hub Motor Co. v. Zurawski, 157 Ga. App. 850, 851, 278 S.E.2d
689, 690 (1981); GNP Commodities v. Walsh Heffernan Co., 95 III. App. 3d 966, 978, 420
N.E.2d 659, 669 (1981); Champion Ford Sales, Inc. v. Levine, 49 Md. App. 547, 554, 433
A.2d 1218, 1222 (1981); Koperski v. Husker Dodge, Inc., 208 Neb. 29, 41, 302 N.W.2d
655, 662 (1981); Welch v. Fitzgerald-Hicks Dodge, Inc., 121 N.H. 358, 364, 430 A.2d 144,
148 (1981); Oberg v. Phillips, 615 P.2d 1022, 1024 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980); Bergenstock v.
Lemay's G.M.C., Inc., 118 R.I. 75, 82, 372 A.2d 69, 72 (1977); see also 4 R. ANDERSON,
ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-608:20 (3d ed. 1983 & Supp. 1984).
39. 285 S.C. at 615, 330 S.E.2d at 560.
40. Id. Burris' main concern was his inability to secure the type of insurance that he
wanted. The trial court held as a matter of law that the marina had met its obligation to
furnish insurance at the agreed price. Record at 231-33.
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in favor of Burris and awarded him $7500, which was the
purchase price of the boat. The court of appeals affirmed the
jury's verdict.
The court of appeals cited Erling v. Homera, Inc.41 and
McGilbray v. Scholfield Winnebago, Inc.4 2 for the proposition
that substantial impairment in value to a buyer is a question of
fact to be determined by the jury.43 Although Erling and McGil-
bray represent the majority view," neither case presented facts
analogous to those in Burris. Erling and McGilbray involved
nonconformities that arose from the product itself, whereas the
boat in Burris was in perfect operating condition.45 Conse-
quently, if a nonconformity existed in Burris, it arose from the
fact that the buyer in Burris bargained for a "demonstrator"
boat with a full warranty for future repairs and instead received
a used boat with no such warranty. 8
The marina argued that even though substantial impair-
ment was an issue of fact, Burris had not presented sufficient
evidence to support a jury finding of substantial impairment in
value.47 In rejecting this argument, the court emphasized the
testimony of a former employee of the marina who stated that
because Burris' boat had been used, it had no warranty for fu-
41. 298 N.W.2d 478 (N.D. 1980).
42. 221 Kan. 605, 561 P.2d 832 (1977).
43. 285 S.C. at 615, 330 S.E.2d at 560.
44. The minority view, which states that the question of substantial impairment is
an issue of law, is represented by Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349
(Minn. 1977). The court in Durfee, however, admitted that, "[t]he determination of sub-
stantial impairment necessarily involves factual findings .... ." Id. at 354.
45. See Record at 76, 165. The difference between the nonconformity arising from
the product or some other aspect of the contractual agreement is significant in determin-
ing whether a nonconformity exists in the first instance. The majority of cases under § 2-
608 generally arise from defects in the product. See generally Annotation, What Consti-
tutes "Substantial Impairment" Entitling Buyer to Reuoke His Acceptance of Goods
Under UCC § 2-608(1), 98 A.L.R.3D 1183 (1980). A nonconformity, however, does not
necessarily have to arise from a defect in the product. A nonconformity can include any
failure to perform in accordance with the obligations under the contract. S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 36-2-106(2) (1976); see also U.C.C. § 2-608, 1A U.L.A. 286, 290 n.3 (1976 & Supp.
1985).
46. The trial record is unclear about the nature of the warranty. See Record at 252.
The only testimony in the record about the warranty merely showed that "a warranty on
a used boat [was] a lesser one than a warranty on a new boat," but there was no testi-
mony about the nature of this "lesser" warranty. Id.
47. 285 S.C. at 615, 330 S.E.2d at 560.
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ture repairs.4 The court concluded that this testimony was suffi-
cient to support the jury's finding of substantial impairment
within the meaning of section 36-2-608."9 The court of appeals
appeared to assume that a warranty, with all of its concomitant
rights, was of such significance that any buyer who had bar-
gained for a warranty, but had not received one, could revoke his
acceptance on that basis alone. The court, however, did not dis-
cuss how the lack of a warranty affected Burris directly or how
important a warranty was to Burris in buying the boat. Further-
more, the Burris court was uncertain of the kind of warranty
Burris had on the boat. Even if the testimony of the former em-
ployee was sufficient to submit the case to the jury, the court of
appeals failed to develop a framework for analyzing the nebu-
lous concept of substantial impairment.
Of the several issues constituting the general section 36-2-
608 analysis framework, 50 only one was presented to the court of
appeals in Burris-whether the buyer had presented sufficient
evidence to allow a jury to find a substantial impairment in
value. Although the court concluded that Burris presented suffi-
cient evidence of substantial impairment, the central issue left
unaddressed in Burris was what standard the jury should use in
finding substantial impairment. Courts addressing this trouble-
some issue have looked to several factors in defining substantial
impairment. The ease 1 and cost 52 of repair, the loss of confi-
dence in the seller and the goods,5s and the use of the goods
48. Id.
49. Id. at 615-16, 330 S.E.2d at 560.
50. For a summary of the complex issues that must be addressed by practitioners in
handling revocation of acceptance cases, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-3 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter WHITE &
SUMMERS].
51. American Imports, Inc. v. G.E. Employees W. Region Fed. Credit Union, 37 N.C.
App. 121, 245 S.E.2d 798 (1978)(easily replaced broken automobile fan belt not sufficient
to constitute a substantial impairment in value); Bill McDavid Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Mul-
cahy, 533 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976)(easily replaced defective automobile battery
not sufficient to constitute a substantial impairment in value).
52. Stamm v. Wilder Travel Trailers, 44 IlM. App. 3d 530, 358 N.E.2d 382
(1976)(holding that repair cost of $10 is not sufficient to show a substantial impairment
in value).
53. Overland Bond & Inv. Corp. v. Howard, 9 Ill. App. 3d 348, 292 N.E.2d 168
(1972). In Howard the court held that once a buyer's faith is shaken in a major invest-
ment such as an automobile, the vehicle loses value in the buyer's eyes and "becomes an
instrument whose integrity is substantially impaired and whose operation is fraught with
1986]
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after revocation 54 have all been considered in establishing
whether a nonconformity constitutes a substantial impairment
in value.
While these factors serve as guidelines in handling substan-
tial impairment cases, the major theoretical problem facing
courts has resulted from language within section 36-2-608 and
its official comments. The buyer can revoke his acceptance of
goods "whose nonconformity substantially impairs its value to
him. . ."I" The "to him" language seems to indicate that sub-
stantial impairment should be determined by a subjective stan-
dard. Comment 2 of section 36-2-608 expressly states that the
proper test is whether the nonconformity is sufficient to cause a
substantial impairment in value to the buyer, even though the
seller had no advance knowledge of the particular buyer's cir-
cumstances." The test is subjective because it is based on an
evaluation of the nonconformity's effect upon the particular
buyer asserting the right of revocation.
The subjective approach has been squarely rejected by a
handful of courts.57 These courts have adopted an objective ap-
proach, in which substantial impairment is determined by the
effect the nonconformities would have upon a reasonable or or-
dinary purchaser under the same or similar circumstances. Since
few courts have felt obliged to ignore comment 2,1s many courts
have sought to blend the subjective and objective approaches
into a test known as the personalized objective test5 9 Despite its
apprehension." Id. at 177 (quoting Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441,
240 A.2d 195 (1968)).
54. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Sygitowicz, 18 Wash. App. 658, 571 P.2d 224 (1977).
55. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-608(1) (1976)(emphasis added).
56, Id. § 36-2-608 comment 2 (1976). Two cases that have followed the subjective
approach are Barrington Homes of Florida, Inc. v. Kelly, 320 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1975), and Jorgensen v. Presnall, 274 Or. 285, 545 P.2d 1382 (1976).
57. See Herbstman v. Eastman Kodak Co., 68 N.J. 1, 342 A.2d 181 (1975); Hays
Merchandise, Inc. v. Dewey, 78 Wash. 2d 343, 474 P.2d 270 (1970).
58. One commentator, however, has suggested that comment 2 should be completely
ignored. Whaley, Tender, Acceptance, Rejection and Revocation - The UCC's "Tarr"-
Baby, 24 DRAKE L. REv. 52, 76 (1974). Professor Whaley argues that "courts should
(adopt] a rule analogous to section 2-315's warranty of fitness for a particular purpose:
the buyer may revoke only if the non-conformity is one that would substantially impair
the value of the goods to the ordinary purchaser, unless [the] seller has reason to know
of [the] buyer's high standard or special needs, in which case the impairment of the
buyer's own particular situation will be the relevant inquiry." Id.
59. See Keen v. Modern Trailer Sales, Inc., 40 Colo. App. 527, 578 P.2d 668 (1978);
[Vol. 38
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oxymoronic name, the personalized objective test represents a
pragmatic approach to determining substantial impairment.
Courts adopting this test must strike a delicate balance. Those
courts attempt to follow the directions of comment 2 and to con-
sider the circumstances of the particular buyer on the one hand,
while trying to avoid revocations for trivial nonconformities on
the other.60 The personalized objective test is merely a vehicle
for meshing the internal inconsistencies of section 36-2-608. The
test is personalized because the court views the surrounding cir-
cumstances from the buyer's perspective. Nevertheless, the test
is objective since the court looks at what a reasonable person
would have expected in the same position as the buyer. In short,
the determination of substantial impairment is not made in ref-
erence to the buyer's personal belief about the reduced value of
the goods. Instead, the trier of fact must make an objective de-
termination that the value of the goods has in fact been substan-
tially impaired. The particular buyer's circumstances are used as
a backdrop against which the substantial impairment determi-
nation is made.
The Burris opinion leaves practitioners with little indication
of the approach South Carolina courts will follow. The question
is important because the approach followed dictates the kind of
evidence the buyer needs to present on the issue of substantial
impairment. Under a subjective approach, the buyer needs to
emphasize how the nonconformity affected him. The objective
Black v. Don Schmid Motor, Inc., 232 Kan. 458, 657 P.2d 517 (1983); GNP Commodities
v. Walsh Heffernan Co., 95 Ill. App. 3d 966, 420 N.E.2d 659 (1981); Welch v. Fitzgerald-
Hicks Dodge, Inc., 121 N.H. 358, 430 A.2d 144 (1981); Massingale v. Northeast Cortez,
Inc., 27 Wash. App. 749, 620 P.2d 1009 (1980). The phrase "personalized objective test"
is taken from R. ANDERSON, supra note 38, at 187.
Not only are the commentators in disagreement over which approach the courts are
following; they also disagree over which approach the courts should follow. Compare R
ANDERSON, supra note 38, at 186 nn. 2-3 with WHrrE & SuMhmRS, supra note 50, at 308
n. 44. This disagreement stems mainly from the courts paying lip service to comment 2
while simultaneously looking for objective factors.
60. For a classic example of a trivial defect case, see Colonial Dodge, Inc. v. Miller,
121 Mich. App. 466, 328 N.W.2d 678 (1982)(missing spare tire was not a substantial
impairment in value). But see id. at 477, 328 N.W.2d at 682 (Deming, J., dissenting).
Justice Deming pointed out that the missing spare tire was not trivial or unimportant to
the particular buyer in the case. Moreover, the dissent noted that the dealer had specific
knowledge of the buyer's requirement of a spare tire. Id. at 480, 328 N.W.2d at 683
(Deming, J., dissenting). Under the subjective standard, the dissent may have been cor-
rect in asserting that the missing spare tire was not a trivial defect.
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approach, however, requires emphasis on evidence related to the
ordinary buyer. The personalized objective approach demands
both subjective and objective evidence. Until the issue is re-
solved in South Carolina, buyers should present both kinds of
evidence, if possible.
Henry J. White
B. Substantial Impairment in an Installment Contract
In Glennville Elevators, Inc. v. Beard"' the South Carolina
Court of Appeals construed section 32-2-612(3) of the South
Carolina Code, 2 holding that whether there was a substantial
impairment of value of an installment contract was a question of
fact.6 3 The court also attempted to provide some guidance about
how to determine substantial impairment in installment con-
tract cases.
The dispute arose when the parties entered into an oral
agreement in which Glennville agreed to purchase 75,000 bushels
of corn from Beard at $3.25 per bushel. The agreement required
that Beard deliver the corn to Glennville's place of business in
Georgia. Beard began delivery in August 1980 and delivered nine
truckloads pursuant to the oral agreement. Before the trucks left
Bamberg, South Carolina, a third party determined the quality
and quantity of the corn. When the trucks arrived at Glenn-
ville's place of business, Glennville conducted its own tests.
Beard alleged that he delivered 11,148.9 bushels of corn, but
Glennville credited him with delivering only 11,092.4 bushels,
56.5 bushels less than Beard claimed he had delivered. 4 Beard
refused to deliver the balance of corn under the contract because
Glennville had "shorted" him 56.5 bushels of corn on his first
nine deliveries and had docked him for moisture content that
was below the customary maximum."' Glennville then sued
Beard to recover the difference between the contract price of
61. 284 S.C. 335, 326 S.E.2d 185 (Ct. App. 1985).
62. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-612(3) (1976).
63. 284 S.C. at 338, 326 S.E.2d at 187.
64. Id. at 337, 326 S.E.2d at 186. The 56.5 bushel difference resulted from a variance
in scale weights and a weight adjustment for moisture content. Id.
65. 284 S.C. at 337 n.2, 326 S.E.2d at 186 n.2.
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$3.25 per bushel and the $4.14 per bushel it had to pay to cover
for the undelivered corn."'
The action was tried before a master who found that Glenn-
ville had "shorted" Beard on the number of bushels of corn de-
livered and had docked Beard for moisture content that was
within acceptable levels.6 7 The master concluded that the con-
tract was an installment contract68 and held that Glennville's ac-
tions constituted a breach of the entire contract. Thus, Beard
was justified in cancelling the contract pursuant to section 36-2-
70369 of the South Carolina Code.70 The circuit court upheld the
master's decision, and Glennville appealed to the South Carolina
Court of Appeals.
The issue presented to the court of appeals was whether the
evidence supported the lower court's holding that Beard was jus-
tified in cancelling the contract with Glennville. Section 36-2-
703 of the South Carolina Code allows an aggrieved seller to can-
cel an installment contract if the buyer's wrongful action consti-
tuted a breach of the entire contract.7 1 Moreover, section 36-2-
612 provides that a breach of the entire contract occurs when-
ever a nonconformity or default with respect to one or more of
the installments substantially impairs the value of the entire
contract.7 2 Although the court of appeals remanded the case to
66. Id. at 337, 326 S.E.2d at 186. "Code [slection 36-2-712 permits the buyer upon
the seller's breach to purchase substitute goods and recover from seller as damages the
difference between cost of cover and the contract price." Id. at 337 n.3, 326 S.E.2d at 186
n.3.
67. Id. at 337, 326 S.E.2d at 186.
68. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-612(1) (1976) provides the following: "An 'installment
contract' is one which requires or authorizes the delivery of goods in separate lots to be
separately accepted, even though the contract contains a clause 'each delivery is a sepa-
rate contract' or its equivalent." Appellant took no exception to the master's conclusion
that this was an installment contract even though the master did not determine what
constituted an installment. 284 S.C. at 337 n.4, 326 S.E.2d at 186 n.4.
69. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-703 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Where the buyer
wrongfully ...fails to make a payment due on or before delivery or repudiates with
respect to a part or the whole, then . . . if the breach is of the whole contract (§ 36-2-
612), then also with respect to the whole undelivered balance, the aggrieved seller may
...cancel."
70. 284 S.C. at 336, 326 S.E.2d at 186.
71. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-703 (1976).
72. South Carolina Code § 36-2-612(3) provides the following:
Whenever nonconformity or default with respect to one or more install-
ments substantially impairs the value of the whole contract there is a breach of
the whole. But the aggrieved party reinstates the contract if he accepts a non-
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allow the master to determine the issue of substantial impair-
ment, the court attempted to provide some guidance for the
master's analysis. The court of appeals infused the concept of
material breach into the inquiry by stating that Beard "must
show that Glennville's breach was so material as to justify his
refusal to deliver the remainder of the corn. '73 Additionally, the
court asserted that substantial impairment requires greater than
"trivial defects. 7 4 The court implied that substantial impair-
ment might be best viewed as a ratio of defect cost to total cost.
The court of appeals, however, did not suggest at what point an
impairment becomes substantial rather than trivial.
The major shortcoming of Glennville Elevators is that the
court did not specifically define "substantial impairment" as
used in section 36-2-612.75 The concept of substantial impair-
ment, however, is difficult to define in the context of either sin-
gle delivery contracts under section 36-2-60871 or installment
contracts under section 36-2-612. Rather than give a full discus-
sion of this most difficult concept, the court relegated its discus-
sion of substantial impairment to one footnote. In footnote five
of the opinion, the court stated unequivocally that it had been
"unable to locate a case from any jurisdiction that clearly de-
fine[d] substantial impairment. '77 Nevertheless, the court at-
conforming installment without seasonably notifying of cancellation or if he
brings an action with respect only to past installments or demands perform-
ance as to future installments.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-612(3) (1976).
73. 284 S.C. at 338, 326 S.E.2d at 186.
74. Id. at 338 n.5, 326 S.E.2d at 187 n.5. The court cited the following cases as ex-
amples of trivial defects: Pratt v. Winnebago Indus., 463 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Pa.
1979)(motor home repairs costing $400 not substantial where motor home cost $16,000);
Dickson v. U-J Chevrolet Co., 454 So. 2d 964 (Ala. 1984)(defect costing $606 was nominal
in light of $39,849 value of truck); Continental Forest Prods. v. White Lumber Sales,
Inc., 256 Or. 466, 474 P.2d 1 (1970)(variance of four percent below the acceptable grade
of plywood not a substantial variance).
75. 284 S.C. at 338, 326 S.E.2d at 187.
76. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-608(1) (1976) provides: "The buyer may revoke his ac-
ceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose nonconformity substantially impairs its value
to him .... "
77. 284 S.C. at 338 n.5, 326 S.E.2d at 187 n.5. See generally Travalino, The UCC's
Three "R's": Rejection, Revocation and (The Seller's) Right to Cure, 53 U. CIN. L. REv.
931, 997 (1984). Several commentators have looked to the Uniform Sales Act for guid-
ance concerning what constitutes substantial impairment within the meaning of § 2-612.
See 4 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 2-612:10 (3d ed.
1983 & Supp. 1984); 3 A. SQUILLANTE & S. FONSECA, WILLISTON ON SALES § 24-3 (4th ed.
[Vol. 38
14
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol38/iss1/6
CONTRACT LAW
tempted to extract some basic principles from a few leading sub-
stantial impairment cases to provide some guidance on how to
determine substantial impairment in installment contract cases.
The court noted that the basic purpose behind the substan-
tial impairment requirement was to preclude cancellation of
contracts on the basis of trivial defects. Furthermore, stringent
requirements to cancel an installment contract particularly are
needed to "support the policy of avoiding abrupt terminations of
long-term contractual arrangements for insignificant reasons."78
In support of these basic policies, the court cited several cases in
which the defect was held to be trivial because the cost of repair
was significantly less in relation to the value of the product.79
Even though the ease and cost of repair are factors in determin-
ing substantial impairment, the court failed to draw any distinc-
tion between the meaning of substantial impairment as used in
section 36-2-608, which deals with single performance contracts,
and section 36-2-612, which deals with installment contracts. It
is unclear, however, whether both sections contemplate the same
standard for determining substantial impairment. Section 36-2-
608 applies only to the buyer, and the official comments indicate
that the determination of substantial impairment is made from
the buyer's perspective. s0 In contrast, section 36-2-612 applies to
any aggrieved party, whether buyer or seller. Furthermore, the
official comments contain no language indicating a preference
for an objective or subjective approach. More importantly, sec-
tion 36-2-612 seems to require that the substantial impairment
determination be made with particular reference to the value of
the entire contract, rather than from either the buyer's or
1974 & Supp. 1985). S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-612 comment 4 (1976) provides that
"[s]ubstantial impairment of the value of an installment can turn not only on the quality
of the goods but also on such factors as time, quantity, assortment and the like."
78. Wallach, The Buyer's Right to Return Unsatisfactory Goods - The Uniform
Commercial Code Remedies of Rejection and Revocation of Acceptance, 20 WASHBURN
L.J. 20, 24 n.19 (1980).
79. See Dickson v. U-J Chevrolet Co., 454 So. 2d 964 (Ala. 1985); Colonial Dodge,
Inc. v. Miller, 121 Mich. App. 466, 328 N.W.2d 678 (1982); Continental Forest Prods. v.
White Lumber Sales, Inc., 256 Or. 466, 474 P.2d 1 (1970).
80. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-608 comment 2 (1976)(suggesting that the "to him"
language in § 36-2-608 requires substantial impairment determination be made from the
buyer's perspective); see 3 R DUESENBERG & L. KING, BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE SERVICE, SALES AND BULK TRANSFERS § 14.02[3][i] (1973).
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seller's perspective."' Even if the standard for determining sub-
stantial impairment is the same for both single performance and
installment contract cases, footnote five fails to state more than
that trivial defects do not constitute substantial impairment in
value.
Arguably, the court's analysis in footnote five should have
led to the conclusion that Glennville's breaches under the con-
tract were trivial and did not justify Beard's cancellation of the
contract. The deficiency of bushels was less than one-tenth of
one percent of the total bushels to have been delivered to Beard
under the contract.8 2 Although the 56.5 bushel difference seems
trivial in relation to the value of the entire contract, the court
apparently considered the record too incomplete to reach such a
conclusion.
Glennville Elevators illustrates the immense difficulties a
court may encounter when attempting to define substantial im-
pairment in the context of either single performance or install-
ment contracts. Nevertheless, practitioners handling installment
contract cases should consider whether the breach of a given in-
stallment is so substantial and material that the value of the en-
tire contract has been impaired.
Henry J. White
III. CHANGES IN RANK OR DUTY MAY SUPPORT AN ACTION FOR
BREACH OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
In Tracey v. Sconnix Broadcasting of South Carolina, Inc.8 3
the South Carolina Supreme Court held that when an employee
is engaged to fill a particular position, any unjustified reduction
of rank or material change of duties of the employee is a viola-
tion of the contract and will support an action for its breach. 4
This holding signals South Carolina's acceptance of a principle
that is well established in other jurisdictions.8 5 The significance
81. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-612 (1976).
82. 284 S.C. at 336 n.1, 326 S.E.2d at 186 n.1.
83. 284 S.C. 379, 325 S.E.2d 542 (1985).
84. Id. at 381, 325 S.E.2d at 544.
85. See, e.g., Essanay Film Mfg. Co. v. Lerche, 267 F. 353 (9th Cir. 1920); Seymore
v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 493 F. Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Hayes v. Resource Control,
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of Tracey lies in the court's acceptance of a jury's decision that a
minor change in an employee's duties-from sales manager to
assistant sales manager-with little change in salary, constitutes
a constructive discharge when that employee has been hired to
fill a particular position.
The plaintiff, John Tracey, contracted with the defendant,
Sconnix Broadcasting of South Carolina, to serve as sales man-
ager for radio station WTMA for one year.86 Under the contract,
he would receive a $24,000 annual salary, a commission of one
and one-half percent of the gross advertising sales, the use of an
automobile, and insurance benefits.
8 7
During the first four months of Tracey's contract, WTMA's
sales were substantially less than sales during the same period of
the previous year. Sconnix decided to restructure the sales de-
partment and change Tracey's duties and job title from sales
manager to assistant sales manager."8 Sconnix guaranteed him a
salary of $24,000 a year or fifteen percent of his own sales, the
use of an automobile, and insurance benefits. Tracey contended
that this change of job duties was a constructive discharge and
sued for breach of his employment contract. The jury returned a
verdict for Tracey, and the South Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed.89
The principal issue the court addressed was whether the al-
teration in Tracey's duties at WTMA constituted a constructive
discharge. The court stated that any unjustified reduction in
rank or material change of duties of an employee engaged to fill
a particular position may make the employer liable for breach of
contract.9 0 The court decided that whether Tracey's reduction in
rank from a sales manager to assistant sales manager caused a
"material" change in his duties was a question of fact for the
170 Conn. 102, 365 A.2d 399 (1976); Brock v. Mutual Reports, 397 A.2d 149 (D.C. 1979);
Savannah River Lumber Co. v. Myers, 27 Ga. App. 399, 108 S.E. 836 (1921). See gener-
ally Annotation, Reduction in Rank or Authority or Change of Duties As Breach of
Employment Contract, 63 A.L.R.3D 539 (1975); 53 AM. Ju. 2D Master and Servant § 144
(1964).
86. 284 S.C. at 380-81, 325 S.E.2d at 543.
87. Id. at 381, 325 S.E.2d at 542.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 382, 325 S.E.2d at 544.
90. Id. at 381, 325 S.E.2d at 544 (citing 53 Am. Jun. 2D Master and Servant § 144
(1964)); see also Brock v. Mutual Reports, 397.A.2d 149 (D.C. 1979).
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jury.91 The court's deference to the fact-finder to determine this
question is supported by precedent.
9 2
Although the court did not cite any South Carolina prece-
dent for the proposition that a change in duties may constitute a
constructive discharge, support for this proposition exists in
other jurisdictions. 3 The court in Essanay, for example, as-
serted, "Nor has the master any right to require that the servant
shall either temporarily or continuously engage in work which is
distinctly and manifestly quite outside the circle of the duties
incident to his position. '9 4 Sconnix' decision to make Tracey an
assistant sales manager probably required him to do more actual
sales work than a sales manager and to perform fewer adminis-
trative functions. The jury determined that this extra sales work
was outside the scope of duties incident to the position of man-
ager.9 5 The change in duties, therefore, amounted to a discharge.
In Tracey the fact that the employee's salary did not de-
crease in the new position did not conclusively establish that the
change of duties was immaterial. This fact alone did not remove
the case from the jury's province and give judgment to the em-
ployer as a matter of law.96 Although evidence of the similarity
in salaries is relevant to show that the change in the employee's
duties was not material, this evidence was not controlling.97 The
rationale behind this view is that the status associated with a
certain position, not simply the salary, may be the factor which
induces an employee to sign an employment contract.9
91. 284 S.C. at 382, 325 S.E.2d at 544.
92. See Essanay Film Mfg. Co. v. Lerche, 267 F. 353 (9th Cir. 1920), in which the
court concluded that "the question whether in any given instance the work is of this
description [outside the scope of the employee's contract for duty] is one of fact." Id. at
359 (quoting I LABATT, MASTER AND SERVANT 879 (1913)).
93. See supra note 85.
94. 267 F. at 359 (quoting 1 LABATT, supra note 92).
95. See 284 S.C. at 381, 325 S.E.2d at 543-44.
96. Id. at 381, 325 S.E.2d at 544; see also Cooper v. Stronge & Warner Co., 111
Minn. 177, 126 N.W. 541 (1910)(employer breached employment contract by offering em-
ployee position as saleswoman when employer had hired her as manager, although the
two salaries were same).
97. 284 S.C. at 381, 325 S.E.2d at 544.
98. The Minnesota Supreme Court noted in Cooper, 111 Minn. at 179, 126 N.W. at
541, that "if a master deliberately enters into a contract providing for the employment of
another as manager, the employe' [sic] has a right to insist upon retaining that grade
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The plaintiff in Tracey argued that, in fact, his salary as
assistant sales manager was not equal to that promised him in
the contract. There was some confusion about the offer of a
"guaranteed" salary of $24,000 per year as an assistant sales
manager, but the plaintiff argued that he would have difficulty
selling enough radio time to earn as much commission money as
he would have earned in his original position.99 The plaintiff also
alleged that the new offer deleted his dental insurance coverage
and made him responsible for his own automobile expenses. 100
These facts made it easier for the court to reject the defendant's
contention that the employer did not demote Tracey but simply
moved him laterally.
The court quickly disposed of Sconnix' second defense, in
which Sconnix contended that even if Tracey was constructively
discharged, the company had good cause for discharging him
and, therefore, could not be liable for breach of contract. Scon-
nix argued that since the sales rate under Tracey's four-month
tenure at the station was barely one-third of the sales rate dur-
ing the same time period in previous years, the defendant had
good cause to fire him as a matter of law.10 1 In such cases, the
employer bears the burden of proof to show good cause. 102 The
court, however, considered good cause for Tracey's discharge to
be an issue of fact and affirmed the jury's judgment that good
cause did not exist.
In Freeman v. King Pontiac Co., 03 however, the South Car-
olina Supreme Court found that good cause to discharge an em-
ployee existed as a matter of law when the vice president of a
corporation disobeyed a lawful order of his president to discon-
tinue a suit against other employees. 0 4 The Freeman court rec-
ognized that the "good cause" question is ordinarily one for the
jury. Since, however, the fact of the plaintiff's disobedience was
undisputed, the court settled the question as a matter of law.'0
Several older South Carolina cases' 06 show this same tendency
99. Brief of Plaintiff at 7.
100. Id.
101. Brief of Defendant at 11.
102. Martin v. Southern Ry., 240 S.C. 460, 470, 126 S.E.2d 365, 370 (1962).
103. 236 S.C. 335, 114 S.E.2d 478 (1960).
104. Id. at 348, 114 S.E.2d at 484.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Berry v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 270 S.C. 489, 242 S.E.2d 551
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to decide the "good cause" question as a matter of law, but rec-
ognize that the question is normally one for the jury. Tracey,
along with another recent decision in this area, Young v. McKel-
vey, 07 may illustrate the modern court's greater reluctance to
disturb jury judgment on the "good cause" issue. In addition,
other jurisdictions point out that if an employee disobeys a com-
mand that he do something not consonant with the position for
which he was hired, the employer would not have good cause to
fire him as a matter of law.10 8
For practitioners, Tracey emphasizes the significance of in-
serting a job description and time period into an employment
contract. Such provisions substantially circumscribe not only the
employer's ability to actually discharge the employee, but also
his ability to shift and reallocate employees within the business
itself.
J. L. Rogers, Jr.
IV. EXCLUSION OF INCIDENTAL AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
FAILS WHEN EXCLUSIVE WARRANTY OF REPAIR AND REPLACEMENT
FAILS OF ITS ESSENTIAL PURPOSE
In Waters v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc.09 the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, applying South Carolina law, held that when
an exclusive warranty of repair and replacement fails its essen-
(1978)(employer had good cause to discharge employee as a matter of law, since facts
were undisputed that employee violated duty of loyalty by working for employer's com-
petitor while on sick leave from employer); Porter v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 247 S.C.
370, 147 S.E.2d 620 (1966)(employer had good cause as a matter of law to discharge
management level employee since employee disobeyed order to report plant's union ac-
tivity to his superiors).
107. 286 S.C. 119, 333 S.E.2d 566 (1985)(summary judgment inappropriate since
genuine issue of fact existed concerning whether employer had good cause to discharge
employee accused of having an affair with fellow employee).
108. Rudman v. Cowles Communications, 30 N.Y.2d 1, 280 N.E.2d 867 (1972)(editor
hired by publishing company and promised that he would be the head of a division not
guilty of insubordination for disobeying orders from persons purportedly not above him
in the corporate hierarchy according to the contract); see Annotation, supra note 85. But
cf. Posey v. R.G. Hill & Co., 218 Ky. 543, 291 S.W. 773 (1927)(plaintiff who signed a
contract to superintend a certain building project and did not object to being reassigned
to a different project could not later claim that the change constituted a breach of
contract).
109. 775 F.2d 587 (4th Cir. 1985).
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tial purpose because the maker is unable to repair its product,
the warranty's exclusion of incidental and consequential dam-
ages also fails.110 Although the decision is not binding on South
Carolina courts,"'- the case is significant since its reasoning may
be persuasive to South Carolina courts considering this issue.
Gilbert Waters purchased a tractor from Massey-Ferguson
in September 1977. When placed in operation, the tractor suf-
fered serious hydraulic failure, which caused delays in Water's
planting. Twice, over the course of three planting seasons, Wa-
ters sent the tractor to Massey-Ferguson "rectification" pro-
grams, but the tractor continued to perform defectively. Waters
finally sold the attachments for the machine and bought a dif-
ferent model. He subsequently brought suit against Massey-Fer-
guson for direct damages incurred in purchasing a defective
product and for compensation for the incidental and conse-
quential damages suffered in substitute planting expenses and
lost profits on his crop. The tractor's warranty, however, limited
the buyer's remedy to repair and replacement of defects and ex-
pressly excluded the seller's liability for incidental or conse-
quential damages. 1 2 The district court granted the plaintiff
$9700 direct damages and $282,500 incidental and consequential
damages." 3 The defendant appealed the judgment for incidental
and consequential damages and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
The parties agreed that Massey-Ferguson's repeated failure
to repair the tractor caused the buyer's exclusive remedy under
the warranty to fail of its "essential purpose" in the sense de-
scribed in section 36-2-719(2) of the South Carolina Code."14 Be-
cause of this failure, the court reasoned that the defendant, in
effect, breached two duties to the buyer. First, the defendant
breached his duty to deliver goods conforming to the express
warranty. Second, the defendant breached his duty to repair the
defect according to the contract."1
5
The court recognized that the contract's exclusion of conse-
quential damages would operate effectively in the event of the
110. Id.
111. 32 AM. JuR. 2D Federal Practice and Procedure § 274 (1982).
112. 775 F.2d at 590.
113. Id.
114. Id.; see S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-719(2) (1976).
115. 775 F.2d at 591.
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first breach. The second breach, however, was not reasonably
contemplated by the parties when the agreement was signed
and, therefore, could not be controlled by the agreement's limi-
tation on consequential damages. The parties contemplated only
"certain repair" of the tractor by Massey-Ferguson. 116 The limi-
tation on consequential damages was intended only to apply to
damages accrued while the tractor was being repaired. The par-
ties never anticipated that the defendant would fail in its duty
to repair; therefore, the contract and its limitations did not
cover this contingency. 117 When the contingency did occur, the
provision excluding consequential damages was inapplicable.
The court reached its result by interpreting the contract,
rather than addressing the broader relationship between sections
36-2-719(2) and 36-2-719(3) of the South Carolina Code.118 Sec-
tion 36-2-719(2) provides that when a remedy fails of its "essen-
tial purpose," recourse may be had "as provided in this
[A]ct."" '0 The Code permits consequential and incidental dam-
ages.120 Section 36-2-719(3), however, permits the exclusion or
limitation of consequential damages unless the exclusion or limi-
tation is unconscionable.' 2' The defendant contended the exclu-
sion of consequential damages should be measured only against
the standard of "unconscionability.' 1 22 If not unconscionable,
the exclusion should be given effect regardless of the failure of
the repair and replacement remedy. The court, however, de-
clined to analyze the relationship of these sections and relied
only on contract interpretation to reach its conclusion.
123
There is a division of opinion on whether a seller may limit
his liability by contract to direct damages when he fails to per-
form the exclusive remedy for which he contracted. Most courts
analyzing this problem mesh statutory considerations of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) with analysis of the contract
116. Id.
117. See id.; see also Consolidated Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Sys., 708
F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1983). See generally Eddy, On the 'Essential' Purpose of Limited
Remedies: The Metaphysics of U.C.C. Section 2-719(2), 65 CALM. L. REv. 28 (1977).
118. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-2-719(2)-(3) (1976).
119. Id. § 36-2-719(2) (1976).
120. Id. § 36-2-714(3) (1976).
121. Id. § 36-2-719(3) (1976).
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issues.11 4 A significant number agree with the result in Waters,
reasoning that the buyer is denied the benefit of his bargain if
the seller is allowed both to repudiate his contractual obligation
to repair and to claim limited liability by the contract.'25 Com-
ment 1 to UCC section 2-719 indicates that the policy behind
section 2-719(2) is to prevent this inequity.126Not all courts,
however, have agreed with the conclusion reached by the Waters
court. Some courts have allowed a contract's exclusion of conse-
quential damages to stand even though the seller does not repair
the defective product.127 These cases generally hold that if a
remedy fails its essential purpose under UCC section 2-719(2),
the clause containing that remedy should be "ignored.' 2s Any
other limitations in the contract, however, should be allowed to
stand as long as they are not "unconscionable.' ' 12 9
Courts upholding an exclusion of consequential damages
when the repair remedy fails have indicated that the seller must
make at least a "good faith" attempt to repair or replace defects
in order to enjoy the contract's prohibition against consequential
damages. 30 It is not expressly stated whether the defendant in
Waters made a "good faith" effort to repair the plaintiff's trac-
tor. Since the plaintiff was a Massey-Ferguson dealer 13  with
124. See Eddy, supra note 117.
125. See Adams v. J.I. Case Co., 125 Ill. App. 2d 388, 261 N.E.2d 1 (1970); see also
Soo L. R.R. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1977); Riley v. Ford Motor Co.,
442 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1971); Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423 (D. Del.
1973). But see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, § 12-10 (1980).
126. U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 1 (1978) notes that when "an apparently fair and rea-
sonable clause because of circumstances fails in its purpose or operates to deprive either
party of the substantial value of the bargain, it must give way to the general remedy
provisions of this Article." See Klein v. Asgrow Seed Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 87, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 609 (1966). Some courts have required that the seller's failure to repair or replace
must be motivated by bad faith in order to destroy the effect of a limitation or liability.
127. County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Eng'g Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1300
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 444 F.2d 372 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1979)(where ex-
clusive remedy clause fails of its essential purpose, the clause is ignored, and other limi-
tations in other clauses should stand or fall independently of it); see also American Elec.
Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); U.S. Fibres,
Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Mich. 1972), aff'd, 509 F.2d 1043
(6th Cir. 1975). But see Koehring Co. v. A.P.I., Inc., 369 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
128. See, e.g., County Asphalt, 323 F. Supp. at 1308.
129. Id.
130. Id.; U.S. Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Mich.
1972).
131. 775 F.2d at 589.
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company-trained personnel in his shop and since Massey-Fergu-
son accepted the tractor twice in its "rectification" programs,
the defendant probably could have argued that it made a "good
faith" effort to repair. 132 If this argument was advanced, how-
ever, the court chose not to address it.
Plaintiff Waters convinced the court that the consequential
damages restriction was invalid. The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp.,'3 however, sug-
gested that a plaintiff need not prove that the consequential
damages restriction was inapplicable in order to recover the
value of lost crops. In Hill the court held that when a herbicide
failed to work properly on a farmer's crops, the measure of ac-
tual damages was the value that the crop would have had if the
product had conformed to the warranty less the value of the
crop actually produced.13 4 The Hill court noted that if this
formula produced a measure of damages that included lost prof-
its, the inclusion was "merely coincidental.' ' 35 Waters might
have argued that the value of his crop due to the tractor's mal-
functioning was an element of direct, not consequential, dam-
ages. The possibilities are unclear, however, since language in
Hill suggests that its holding was confined to latent defect
cases. 36
Waters illustrates the dangers a manufacturer faces by re-
sponding inadequately to customer complaints concerning defec-
tive products. Despite artfully drafted contracts prohibiting con-
sequential damages, courts are willing to grant indirect damages
when the product is simple to repair and the manufacturer does
132. The success of this argument may have depended upon the type of product
involved. The Waters court placed an emphasis on the simplicity or complexity of the
product's technology. Id. at 592-93. Under the court's view, if a product was simple to
repair and the maker failed to repair it, the restriction on consequential damages would
fail. Id. Conversely, if the product was complex, the failure to repair would be excused
and no consequential damages would be allowed. Id.
133. 280 S.C. 174, 311 S.E.2d 734 (1984).
134. Id. at 177-78, 311 S.E.2d at 736.
135. Id. at 178, 311 S.E.2d at 736.
136. Id. at 177, 311 S.E.2d at 735-36. The supreme court stated as follows: "A herbi-
cide failure is a latent defect in the product. There is no reasonable way a farmer can
determine in advance whether a herbicide will perform as warranted. Discovery of the
problem must await development of the crop at which time it is usually too late to cor-
rect." Id.
24
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not make a good faith attempt to repair it.
J. L. Rogers, Jr.
V. CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO ARBITRATION CLARIFIED
In Sentry Engineering & Construction, Inc. v. Mariner's
Cay Development Corp.137 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that the right to arbitration under a contract cannot be
waived without a showing of prejudice and that a failure to rely
exclusively on the arbitration provisions of a contract does not
constitute a waiver of the right to arbitration.138 Additionally,
the court held that an arbitration award can be converted into a
mechanic's lien judgment if the award is for work performed and
not damages for breach of contract.13 9 These holdings represent
an attempt by the court to effectuate the contractual right to
arbitration.
Mariner's Cay Development Corporation (MCDC) and Sen-
try Engineering and Construction (Sentry) executed a "Stan-
dard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor" (Base
Agreement), which provided for a contract price of over
$4,000,000 for Sentry to construct eighty-seven condominium
units at Folly Beach, South Carolina.1 40 Concurrently, the par-
ties executed a separate document entitled "Agreement for
Profit and Overhead" (Side Agreement) for additional compen-
sation above construction cost.1 41 When the construction was
nearly completed, Sentry became concerned that it would not be
paid and, thus, filed a mechanic's lien for balances due under
both agreements. Pursuant to an arbitration clause in the Base
Agreement, Sentry filed a claim with the American Arbitration
Association (AAA) in the amount of its mechanic's lien. Sentry
simultaneously brought an action in circuit court to foreclose its
lien. 4
2
137. 287 S.C. 346, 338 S.E.2d 631 (1985).
138. Id. at 351, 338 S.E.2d at 634.
139. Id. at 352-54, 338 S.E.2d at 635.
140. Id. at 348, 338 S.E.2d at 635; Record at 165; Brief of Respondent at 1.
141. 287 S.C. at 348, 338 S.E.2d at 632.
142. Id. MCDC responded to Sentry's actions by filing a surety bond with Eastern
Indemnity Company of Maryland. Id. The mechanic's lien statute provides for a release
of the lien if the owner of the property files with the court an amount equal to one and
one-third times the amount claimed. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 29-5-110 (1976 & Supp. 1985).
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After rejecting MCDC's objections to arbitration, the trial
court ordered arbitration of all claims arising out of the con-
tract.143 Sentry amended its arbitration complaint and de-
manded damages for MCDC's wrongful termination of the con-
tract. Sentry also sought an injunction to permit it access to the
work site to correct deficiencies in the roofing work.'44 The AAA
found that Sentry was entitled to $503,271. The trial court
adopted the AAA award as a judgment and granted Sentry a
summary judgment on its lien foreclosure petition. 45 MCDC ap-
pealed, raising several issues to be decided by the supreme
court.
146
MCDC initially contended that Sentry had waived its right
to arbitration by filing a petition for an injunction allowing it to
complete certain roof work.147 The supreme court cited several
federal cases and noted that a showing of prejudice is the grava-
men for sustaining an allegation of waiver.'48 The court found no
143. 287 S.C. at 349, 338 S.E.2d at 632.
144. Id. at 349, 338 S.E.2d at 632-33. MCDC refused to pay Sentry because of cer-
tain alleged deficiencies in the roof that would require rep!acement costing approxi-
mately $150,000. Record at 58.
145. 287 S.C. at 349, 338 S.E.2d at 633. The circuit court also assessed interest and
awarded Sentry a reasonable attorney's fee of $80,000; the total judgment was $622,425.
Id.
146. Six issues were raised on appeal: (1) Whether Sentry, by seeking injunctive
relief, had waived its contractual right to arbitration; (2) whether the arbitration award
was convertible into a mechanic's lien judgment; (3) whether the Base and Side Agree-
ments constituted a single unified agreement; (4) whether profit and overhead were com-
ponents of a "debt" as contemplated by the mechanic's lien statute; (5) whether MCDC
was entitled to interest; and (6) whether MCDC was entitled to attorney's fees. 287 S.C.
at 349, 338 S.E.2d at 633. Only the first two issues are discussed in this article; the other
four were disposed of by the court. First, citing Klutts Resort Realty v. Down'Round
Dev. Corp., 268 S.C. 80, 232 S.E.2d 20 (1977), the court found that the Base and Side
Agreements incorporated each other and that the purpose of both documents was com-
pensation for project construction. Thus, the two documents constituted an integrated
contract subject to arbitration. 289 S.C. at 349-51, 326 S.E.2d at 633-34. Second, citing
53 Ai. JUR. 2D Mechanics' Liens § 107 (1970), the court held that overhead and profit,
when stated as a part of the contract price, were proper components of a mechanic's lien.
Id. at 351-52, 326 S.E.2d at 634-35. Third, the court held that the award of interest from
the date of the AAA award to the date of judgment was proper because a dispute arose
concerning whether acceptance of the award would require Sentry to give up its claim for
attorney's fees. Id. at 354, 326 S.E.2d at 635-36. Last, the court held that the award of
attorney's fees was proper under § 29-5-410 and facilitated the legislative policy of pro-
moting arbitration of contract disputes. Id. at 354-55, 326 S.E.2d at 636.
147. 287 S.C. at 351, 338 S.E.2d at 634.
148. See Germany v. River Terminal Ry., 477 F.2d 546, 547 (6th Cir. 1973)(holding
that a party need not rely exclusively on arbitration provisions of contract but can also
26
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prejudice in the delay caused by the petition for an injunction
because MCDC suffered only the inconvenience of defending
against the petition for the injunction. More importantly, the
court found that a party need not rely exclusively on the arbitra-
tion remedy, but could seek to meet all issues arising from the
contract by any legal remedy available.'49 In its ruling, the su-
preme court in Sentry adopted a rule consistent with the na-
tional policy encouraging arbitration.150 The court in Commer-
cial Metals Co. v. International Union Marine Corp.15' stated
this policy, noting that "[t]he essential test is whether the pur-
suit of a remedy other than arbitration has worked substantial
prejudice to the other party.'
15 2
It might appear inconsistent that Sentry sought both the in-
junction and arbitration and that this inconsistency indicated an
intention not to enforce the arbitration clause. The inconsis-
tency in Sentry's actions, however, did not determine whether
the right to arbitration had been waived. 53 Instead, the court
looked for the presence or absence of prejudice. 54 In short, par-
ties to contracts containing arbitration clauses can seek to meet
all issues raised in litigation between them as long as their ac-
tions do not prejudice the objecting party. This result is consis-
tent with the policy of promoting arbitration as a mechanism for
the speedy and economical resolution of commercial disputes.
MCDC, relying on Sea Pines Co. v. Kiawah Island Co.,
55
argued, in the alternative, that Sentry was attempting to use the
mechanic's lien statute as a vehicle for collecting damages for
breach of contract. 56 In Sea Pines the supreme court held that
attempt to meet all issues raised in litigation); Carcich v. Rederi A/B Nordie, 389 F.2d
692, 696 (2d Cir. 1968)(holding that the presence or absence of prejudice is the determi-
native factor when waiver is asserted); Batson Yarn & Fabrics Mach. Group v. Saurer-
Alma GmbH-Allgauer Maschinenbau, 311 F. Supp. 68, 73 (D.S.C. 1970)(holding that no
waiver results from mere delay in moving for arbitration). All three cases resisted a find-
ing of waiver to further the federal policy promoting arbitration. See generally Annota-
tion, Defendant's Participation in Action as Waiver of Right to Arbitration of Dispute
Involved Therein, 98 A.L.R.3D 767 (1980).
149. 287 S.C. at 351, 338 S.E.2d at 634.
150. See generally 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 2 nn. 23-25 and accompanying text (1975).
151. 294 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
152. Id. at 573.
153. 389 F.2d at 696.
154. 287 S.C. at 351, 338 S.E.2d at 634.
155. 268 S.C. 153, 232 S.E.2d 501 (1977).
156. 287 S.C. at 352-53, 338 S.E.2d at 635.
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a mechanic's lien may only secure a debt for labor performed or
for materials furnished and that it could not be used as a mech-
anism for collecting damages from breach of contract. 15 MCDC
pointed out that Sentry's amended arbitration demand sought
damages, which should have precluded a foreclosure on the
mechanic's lien as a method of enforcing the AAA award. The
supreme court, however, held that reliance upon Sea Pines was
misplaced. 8
At the summary judgment hearing regarding the mechanic's
lien foreclosure, each party presented an affidavit concerning
what claims were represented in the AAA award. These two affi-
davits comprised the entire record on this issue because the
AAA granted a lump sum award without dividing the award
among the several claims made by the parties.159 The supreme
court found that MCDC's affidavit was conclusory since it con-
tained no statement that Sentry actually submitted a claim for
damages to the AAA. °60 Sentry's affidavit, on the other hand,
stated that all the claims presented to the AAA were claims for
work performed on the project. Based upon these two affidavits,
the supreme court concluded that the trial court was correct in
allowing the conversion of the arbitration award into a
mechanic's lien, because the award represented compensation
for work performed and not damages for breach of contract.1 6'
The result in Sentry is consistent with section 15-48-220 of
the South Carolina Code,6 2 which expressly permits the filing
and perfecting of a mechanic's lien by any party to an arbitra-
tion agreement without waiving the right to enforce the agree-
ment. Since the statute allows a party to an arbitration agree-
ment to file and perfect a mechanic's lien, the court logically
should stay the suit to foreclose the mechanic's lien until liabil-
157. 268 S.C. at 159, 232 S.E.2d at 503.
158. 287 S.C. at 353, 338 S.E.2d at 635.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 354, 338 S.E.2d at 635.
162. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-220 (Supp. 1985). Other jurisdictions, however, have
reached differing results on whether the filing of a mechanic's lien or the instituting of
an action or proceeding to enforce a lien constitutes a waiver of the right to arbitration.
Most often, this determination is one of fact, dependent upon the applicable state
mechanic's lien statute. See generally Annotation, Filing of Mechanic's Lien or Proceed-
ing for Its Enforcement as Affecting Right to Arbitration, 73 A.L.R.3D 1066 (1976)(dis-
cussing the effect that a mechanic's lien has on the contractual right to arbitration).
[Vol. 38
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ity has been determined by arbitration. The court can then af-
firm the arbitration award and enforce it through the lien. In
short, the South Carolina Code allows a party to seek arbitration
and simultaneously to file and perfect a mechanic's lien.
The consequence of Sentry is that an arbitration award can
be enforced by foreclosing the mechanic's Hen as long as the
award contains compensation only for labor performed or mater-
ials furnished and not for damages for breach of contract.16 3 At
least one jurisdiction, Florida, has statutorily implemented the
procedure sustained in Sentry.16 4 This procedure permits the
trial court to stay the mechanic's lien foreclosure action, to order
that liability be determined by arbitration, and to affirm the
award as the judgment of the trial court by enforcing the lien.6 5
The procedure adopted in Sentry allows a trial court much
needed flexibility in addressing various issues arising from a
complex construction contract and also promotes judicial econ-
omy and efficiency by permitting inconsistent claims to be han-
dled in a logical manner. Thus, Sentry represents the supreme
court's attempt to uphold the contractual right of arbitration in
order to avoid needless litigation and provides specific proce-
dural guidance in handling certain arbitration matters.
Henry J. White
163. 287 S.C. at 352-53, 338 S.E.2d at 35.
164. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Berhalter, 405 So. 2d 1027, 1029 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981); Mills v. Robert W. Gottfried, Inc., 272 So. 2d 837, 838-39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1973)(construing the Florida Arbitration Code, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 682.01-22 (Harrison
1980)).
165. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.03 (Harrison 1980).
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